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AUCTIONS WITH UNTRUSTWORTHY BIDDERS
Sviatoslav Braynov, Radoslav Pavlov
Abstract. The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforce-
able. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obliga-
tions, and parties involved cannot rely on external enforcement or control
mechanisms for backing up a transaction. We propose two mechanisms
that make bidders directly or indirectly reveal their trustworthiness. The
first mechanism is based on discriminating bidding schedules that separate
trustworthy from untrustworthy bidders. The second mechanism is a gene-
ralization of the Vickrey auction to the case of untrustworthy bidders. We
prove that, if the winner is considered to have the trustworthiness of the
second-highest bidder, truthfully declaring one’s trustworthiness becomes a
dominant strategy. We expect the proposed mechanisms to reduce the cost
of trust management and to help agent designers avoid many market failures
caused by lack of trust.
1. Introduction Auctions have been extensively used in e-commerce as
a means for price determination for multilateral trading without market interme-
diaries. They are particulary useful in markets with incomplete and asymmetric
information, where the bidders’ private information is the main factor determi-
ning strategic behavior.
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As mechanisms for distributed optimization, auctions can offer several
computational challenges. Determining the winners in combinatorial auctions,
for example, is a complex optimization problem that has been recently studied
[30, 27, 26, 13]. Several bidding languages have been proposed in an effort to
reduce the communication overhead [15, 28]. Another important thread tries
to identify auction protocols limiting the preferences that are to be revealed by
bidders [1, 33, 10].
Most of the literature on auction theory has focused on well defined and
enforceable auctions. It is usually assumed that auction results are binding for
the auctioneer and bidders. That is, each party behaves as expected, and carries
out their obligations. Many on-line auctions do not usually meet this assumption.
Economic agents can fail to perform their tasks or to meet their commitments
due to lack of incentives, lack of ability, or circumstances beyond their control.
Internet users still fear the possibility of fraud, identity change, misuse of private
information, etc. Complaints about online auction transactions have skyrocketed,
accounting for 87 percent of the Internet fraud reports made to the Internet
Fraud Watch in the first six months of 2002, compared to 70 percent in 2001
(www.fraud.org).
This paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In
such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations and parties
involved cannot rely on external enforcement or control mechanisms for backing
up a transaction. An important characteristic of these settings is the risk of
losses due to failure, fraud, or inability of other parties to fulfill their contractual
obligations. Another important characteristic is the presence of asymmetric
information. That is, untrustworthy agents may not communicate private in-
formation concerning their contractual abilities or intentions.
In the paper, we analyze a multidimensional auction in which a trust-
worthy buyer faces many sellers with varying degree of trustworthiness. The
buyer does not know the bidders’ trustworthiness and has to move first after
the auction has been closed. That is, the buyer has to make the payment
without having any guaranties of delivery. Such a setting raises several important
questions. The first one is how to evaluate bids. The profitability of each bid
depends on the bidder’s trustworthiness, which is privately known to the bidder.
Another question is what kind of incentive-compatible schemes are possible and
what is their economic efficiency.
Many applications of mechanism design [24, 21, 25, 23] consider schemes
that provide sufficient incentives to parties to reveal privately known information.
The problem in our case is that the auctioneer faces uncertain profits and has to
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move first without being able to condition his payment on contractual performance.
For example, the standard Vickrey auction fails to provide bidders with sufficient
incentives to truthfully declare their trustworthiness.
In the paper, we study two mechanisms that make agents truthfully reveal
their trustworthiness. The first mechanism is based on constrained bidding,
in which the auctioneer offers different bidding schedules for different types of
bidders. The schedules are designed to separate trustworthy from untrustworthy
bidders. That is, all trustworthy bidders choose one schedule, while untrust-
worthy bidders choose another. This eliminates information asymmetry, and
allows the auctioneer to evaluate bids using the actual bidders’ trustworthiness.
The second mechanism is a generalization of the Vickrey auction to the
case of untrustworthy bidders. In the auction, the highest bidder wins and the
terms of trade are chosen as if the winner had the trustworthiness of the second-
highest bidder.
The auction analyzed in the paper is three-dimensional, where sellers bid
on price and quantity, besides reporting their trustworthiness. Multidimensional
auctions arise frequently and have been extensively studied [8, 5]. For example,
many defense procurement auctions involve multidimensional bids on promised
technical characteristics, delivery date, estimated project costs, etc.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief formalization
of trust in the context of e-commerce. Section 3 defines the problem setting in
which an auctioneer faces many bidders with varying degree of trustworthiness. A
discriminating auction based on several bidding schedules is described in Section
4. In the auction, agents reveal their trustworthiness by choosing different sche-
dules. Section 5 presents a generalization of the Vickrey auction to the case of
untrustworthy bidders. Finally, the paper concludes by summarizing the results
and providing directions for future research.
2. A formal framework of trust. The concept of trust has been a
subject of continuous interest in different research areas, including multi-agent
systems [20, 6, 4, 7, 2], game theory and economics [18, 11, 32], sociology [9, 19],
risk-analysis [14], and psychology [31]. The notion of trust is also closely related
to the design and implementation of multi-stage safe exchanges [29, 22].
Trust has different connotations and has been used in different meanings
in different contexts by different authors. Many authors [7, 12] consider trust as
a belief or cognitive stance that could eventually be quantified by a subjective
probability [14, 16]. We give a brief conceptualization of trust that will help avoid
confusion and will facilitate further exposition.
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We assume that trust is a bilateral relation that involves an entity manifes-
ting trust called the trustor and an entity being trusted called the trustee.
Further, we assume that
— There is an event Γ that the trustor cannot control and that depends on
the trustee. The trustee may have partial or full control over Γ.
— The trustor voluntarily decides to put himself in a position dependent on Γ
in the sense that the trustor will benefit if Γ occurs, otherwise he will lose.
In other words, the trustor depends on the trustee for some event Γ which is
controlled by the trustee. Since it is Γ what affects the trustor, we assume that
trustworthiness could be measured by the probability of Γ. For example, the
trustee could be an untrustworthy seller and Γ = {The seller delivers promised
merchandize after it has been paid for}. In another example, the trustor could
depend on the trustee for some information and Γ = {The trustee delivers
accurate and truthful information}. Another interpretation is Γ = {The quality
of the merchandize meets the buyer’s expectation}.
In general, two types of trustworthiness can be identified: perceived and
actual. Perceived trustworthiness is defined as the trustor’s subjective belief in Γ
which could be different from the objective trustworthiness, that is, the objective
probability of Γ. For example, an agent might delegate a task to another agent,
believing that the task can be successfully executed with probability αˆ, while the
actual success rate of the performing agent is α.
Formally, the trustor’s utility function can be denoted by:
(1) U(αˆ,Γ(p1, . . . , pn))
where U is the trustor’s utility, p1, . . . , pn are parameters describing the event Γ,
and αˆ is the degree of perceived trustworthiness, i.e., the degree in which Γ is
expected to happen.
The event Γ is favorable to the trustor:
∂U(αˆ,Γ(p1, . . . , pn))
∂αˆ
≥ 0
That is, the trustor benefits from higher trustworthiness. The case of complete
trustworthiness is represented by αˆ = 1, and vice versa, the trustee is completely
untrustworthy when αˆ = 0:
U(1,Γ(p1, . . . , pn)) > 0
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U(0,Γ(p1, . . . , pn)) < 0
If we assume that utility is a continuous function of trustworthiness, then there
is a threshold level αˆ0 ∈ [0, 1] that separates trustworthiness from untrustworthi-
ness:
U(αˆ,Γ(p1, . . . , pn)) ≥ 0 for all αˆ ≥ αˆ0
That is, he trustor is always better off if the other agent’s trustworthiness exceeds
the threshold αˆ0 which depends on the event Γ and its parameters p1, . . . , pn.
This defines a natural participation constraint : the trustor will place trust on the
trustee (or will voluntarily agree to depend on the trustee) if the the trustee’s
perceived trustworthiness exceeds αˆ0. The participation constraint corresponds
to the intuition that an agent will only engage in an interaction if the trust-
worthiness of the other party exceeds some threshold (the level of acceptable
trustworthiness), which depends on the interaction context (through parameters
p1, . . . , pn) and on the trustor (through the trustor’s utility function U). In other
words, the threshold αˆ0 is both objectively and subjectively determined.
Such a formalization of trust is domain independent and captures a wide
range of applications where the trustor believes that the trustee will behave in
some expected way specified by the event Γ. Depending on the context the
subjective (or objective) trustworthiness can be given different interpretations.
For instance, it could be the probability of delivery, the probability of high
product quality, probability that an agent will follow contract terms, etc.
By choosing probability αˆ (or α) as a measure of trustworthiness we do
not mean that trust always depends on a single factor. The event Γ may have
a complex structure represented by parameters p1, . . . , pn. In another work of
ours [17] we experimentally validated a multidimensional model of trust in on-
line exchanges. We showed that the following six factors affect trust: information
content, product, transaction, technology, institutions, and consumer-behavior.
We assume that all these factors could be combined so as to produce a single
measure of an agent’s trustworthiness. In other words, we can think of α as
a measure of the combined effect of different constituents and determinants of
trust.
3. Problem setting. This section describes an auction with untrust-
worthy bidders. A buyer solicits bids from sellers with two different levels of
trustworthiness α and β, α < β;α, β ∈ [0, 1]. Both α and β are normalized
measures of a bidder’s commitment to back up his bids. For the ease of in-
terpretation, α and β could be thought of as probability of delivery, measure of
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quality, ability, etc. For example, in one interpretation, a less trustworthy bidder
will deliver with probability α if he wins the auction, while a more trustworthy
bidder will deliver with probability β. Each bidder knows only his own type
(α or β) and the set of possible types is common knowledge among the buyer
and the sellers. Throughout the paper, we refer to bidders of type α and β as
untrustworthy and trustworthy bidders, respectively, assuming that the variation
in trustworthiness is significant enough to make a difference.
The buyer is completely trustworthy and he makes the first move after
the auction has been closed. That is, the buyer pays first without knowing
the probability of delivery. Since by moving first the buyer explicitly discloses
his type, the assumption of complete buyer’s trustworthiness does not limit the
generality of the model.
Each bid specifies an offer of promised quantity q and price p. The buyer
and the sellers are risk-neutral, and the buyer derives utility from a bid, (p, q) ∈
R
2
+:
(2) U(p, q, θ) = V (q, θ)− p
where θ is the bidder’s trustworthiness, θ ∈ {α, β}, and V (q, θ) is the buyer
valuation function, Vq > 0, Vqq < 0, and Vq(0, p) = 0 to ensure an interior
solution. Subscripts denote partial derivatives.
A bidder, upon winning, earns from a bid (p, q) the following profits:
(3) W (p, q, θ) = p− C(q, θ)
where W and C are the bidder’s utility and cost functions, respectively. We
assume Cqq > 0, Cθ > 0, and Cqθ > 0. Thus, both the total and the marginal
cost increase with θ. To understand the intuition behind these assumptions, it is
convenient to view one’s trustworthiness as a measure of quality or probability
of delivery. Production costs usually increase with quality, all other things being
equal. In addition, trustworthy agents may incur added costs for establishing
and keeping a good reputation. In economic literature, [3] trustworthiness is
often modelled as a financial asset requiring a certain level of capital investment.
The problem with untrustworthy bidders is that the buyer’s utility de-
pends on the trustworthiness of the winner, which is only privately known.
In this case, the informed winner’s trading decision depends on privately held
information in a manner that negatively affects the uninformed auctioneer. With-
out knowing bidders’ types, the auctioneer cannot precisely evaluate the utility
of a bid, and therefore determine the auction winner. Since the buyer is moving
first, he cannot condition his payment on the seller compliance. In addition, we
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assume that the buyer does not have access to indirect indicators of a seller’s
trustworthiness such as reputation database or history of previous interactions.
If the buyer moved second, after verifying, directly or indirectly, the delivery, the
principal-agent theory could be used [24, 21] to design optimal auction rules.
If the auctioneer uses a scoring function equal to his utility, defined by
Equation (3), and asks bidders to reveal their types, then untrustworthy bidders
(θ = α) may have un incentive to report a higher type (θ = β). The problem
is that the scoring function (and the auctioneer’s utility) increases in θ. For
example, in a standard Vickrey auction, the winner has to match the price
and the quality of the second-score bidder. This, however, does not prevent an
untrustworthy bidder from reporting higher trustworthiness. Reporting a higher
type increases the chance of winning the auction without affecting a bidder’s
utility.
Proposition 1. Truthfully declaring an agent’s trustworthiness is not a
dominant strategy in a standard Vickrey auction, where agents bid on price and
quantity.
P r o o f. Since agents bid on price and quantity along with declaring
their types, every bid is a triple (p, q, θ). Note that the reservation level of
untrustworthy bidders lies below the reservation level of trustworthy bidders for
fixed quantity and price. Figure 1 shows the zero-utility indifference curves,
for trustworthy (Itrust) and untrustworthy (Iuntr) bidders as functions of price
and quantity. As long as every untrustworthy bidder submits a bid above the line
Iuntr, he earns nonnegative utility. Since Itrust is not below Iuntr, every bid which
is individually rational for a trustworthy bidder is also individually rational for
an untrustworthy bidder. For example, bid A earns zero utility for a trustworthy
bidder and strictly positive utility, pA − pB, for an untrustworthy bidder. If
the auction winner is an untrustworthy agent, who misrepresented his type,
the second-score bid will always be individually rational for him. Therefore, by
declaring a higher type, an untrustworthy bidder does incur the risk of receiving
negative utility.
Figure 1 also shows the auctioneer’s indifference curves for trustworthy
(Jtrust) and untrustworthy (Juntr) bidders for bid A. That is, Jtrust is the
auctioneer’s indifference curve that passes trough A under the assumption that
the bidder is trustworthy. Since Jtrust is steeper than Juntr, the auctioneer
receives greater utility if bid A is submitted by a trustworthy bidder. Therefore,
by declaring higher trustworthiness, a bidder can increase his chances of winning
the auction with no risk of receiving negative payoff.
Note that bidders reveal their type by submitting bids between lines Jtrust
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Fig. 1. Zero-utility indiffernce curves for trustworthy and untrustworthy bidders
and Juntr. Such bids are not individually rational for trustworthy bidders, and
therefore can be submitted only by untrustworthy agents. 
4. A separating auction. In this section we study the problem of how
to perform bid evaluation and winner determination based solely on information
contained in bids. The problem with untrustworthy bidders is that, by declaring
higher trustworthiness, they can manipulate the way bids are evaluated. We
discuss discriminating auction rules that separate trustworthy from untrustwor-
thy agents.
A natural way to approach the problem with untrustworthy bidders is
to assume that the auctioneer adopts a play-safe strategy and decides to insure
himself against the worst case possible.
Definition 1. In a distrust-based auction, every bidder submits a bid
on price and quality. The auctioneer uses a scoring function S that treats each
bidder as untrustworthy:
S(p, q) = V (q, α) − p
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Unfortunately, being overcautious does not help auctioneers to avoid
untrustworthy bidders.
Proposition 2. There is a strictly positive probability that an untrust-
worthy bidder wins in a distrust-based Dutch, English, first-score, and a second-
score sealed bid auctions. If the difference in trustworthiness, β −α, between the
two agent types is sufficiently large, then only untrustworthy bidders win.
P r o o f. A trustworthy bidder can get a maximal score by submitting a
bid b0 = (C(q0, β), q0), where
q0 = argmax
q
(V (q, α)− C(q, β))
Apparently,
U(b0, α) = V (q0, α)− C(q0, β))
W (b0, β) = 0
That is, a trustworthy seller receives zero utility from b0, while the auctioneer
receives V (q0, α)−C(q0, β). On the other hand, an untrustworthy bidder receives
a strictly positive utility from b0:
W (b0, α) = C(q0, β) −C(q0, α) > 0
Therefore, an untrustworthy bidder can always underbid a trustworthy bidder
by sending b1 = (C(q0, β) − , q0). Note that biding below b0 is not individually
rational for a trustworthy bidder. If the two bidder types differ significantly,
β  α, then the equilibrium in which a trustworthy bidder bids b0 and an
untrustworthy bidder bids below b0 is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
for the Dutch, first-score and second-score sealed bid auctions auctions. An
untrustworthy bidder wins in a English auction, as well.
If the difference between levels of trustworthiness is small, than both types
of agents will adopt mixed strategies depending on the auction rules. Hence, there
is always a strictly positive probability that an untrustworthy seller wins. 
Proposition 2 can be explained using the cost differences between agent
types. If the difference in trustworthiness is sufficiently large, trustworthy bidders
incur sufficiently large costs compared to untrustworthy bidders, which prevents
them from submitting competitive bids, and therefore from winning an auction.
Another way to solve the problem with untrustworthy bidders is to consi-
der trustworthiness as a random variable and to evaluate bids using its expecta-
tion, E(θ). Unfortunately, a similar proposition here as well.
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Proposition 3. Suppose that an auctioneer evaluates bids according to
his expectation of agents’ trustworthiness:
S(p, q) = V (q, E(θ))− p
There is a strictly positive probability that an untrustworthy bidder wins in Dutch,
English, first-score, and second-score sealed bid auctions. If the difference in
trustworthiness, β−α, between the two agent types is sufficiently large, then only
untrustworthy bidders win.
P r o o f. Parallels the proof of Proposition 2 after substituting E(θ) for α
in bid evaluation. 
Propositions 2–3 show that, in some cases, trustworthy agents will be
driven out of the market, thereby causing a market inefficiency. To fix the
problem, we investigate constrained-bidding mechanisms.
Definition 2. In a constrained-bidding multidimensional auction, an
eligible bid satisfies a set of constraints on bid parameters.That is, for every
eligible bid b(t1, . . . , tn) we have
φk(t1, . . . , tn) for k = 1, . . . ,m
where {φk}
m
k=1 is a set of constraint predicates.
For example, the auction rules can fix the quantity to q0 and define a
minimal and a maximal price:
(4) q = q0, and p ∈ [pmin, pmax]
One possible interpretation is that the maximal price is the auctioneer’s reserva-
tion level, and the minimal price is the reservation level for a bidder of a certain
type. In our setting, constraints (4) reduce a two-dimensional auction on price
and quantity to a unidimensional auction on price.
One important characteristic of constrained auctions is that the bidders’
expected utility can be ex-ante limited by the auction rules. For example,
constraints (4) impose an upper bound, pmax − C(q0, θ), and a lower bound
pmin − C(q0, θ) for type θ bidders. By choosing a particular set of constraints,
the auctioneer can affect the incentive structure of the auction, and therefore can
provide bidders with additional incentives. We will show that in our case, the
bidders could be given incentives to reveal directly or indirectly their type.
We assume that, if a seller faces a choice between two auctions, he will
choose an auction which gives him a better utility range, all other things being
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equal. For example, if a seller must choose between an auction A1 with a utility
range [2, 10] and a auction A2 with a utility range [0, 8], he would choose A1,
all other things being equal. The intuition behind this assumption is that every
bidding strategy for a auction A2 gives a better expected utility when applied to
auction A1.
Assumption 1. Given an auction A1 with a utility range [a
1
min
, a1max]
and an auction A2 with a utility range [a
2
min
, a2max], where the only difference
between A1 and A2 is
a1min > a
2
min
a1max > a
2
max
a1max − a
1
min = a
2
max − a
2
min
then a risk-neutral bidder prefers auction A1 to auction A2.
In other words, in both auctions, a bidder has the same strategy set, faces
the same opponents and the same rules, with the only difference being strategy
payoffs. In Assumption 1, both auctions have the same length of utility range. If
utility ranges differ, then a risk-neutral bidder can still prefer auction A1 if the
lower utility bound of A1 exceeds the upper utility bound of A2:
a1min ≥ a
2
max
The intuition is that every bidding strategy in A1 yields a greater payoff than a
bidding strategy in A2, all other things being equal. In the next section, we will
drop Assumption 1 and propose a generalized Vickrey auction in which truth-
telling is a dominant strategy.
Using bidders’ preferences for auctions, the auctioneer can distinguish, or
screen, various types of bidders by offering different bid constraints to different
types of bidders.
Definition 3. In a separating constrained-bidding auction, the auc-
tioneer offers two sets of bid constraints. A bidder chooses a set of constraints
and strictly follows this set throughout the auction. All other auction rules remain
the same for all bidders. A bidder is not allowed to change his set of constraints
during an auction.
In other words, there are two bidding schedules, each bidder chooses and
follows only one schedule, and all bidders compete with one another. That is, each
bidder competes with both the bidders from his schedule and the bidders from the
other schedule. For example, in a separating constrained-bidding auction based
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on the first-score rule the bidder with the highest score wins. In the beginning,
the auctioneer offers two sets of bid constraints. A bidder either chooses a set
of constraints and submits a bid (or bids) satisfying only this set, or rejects the
auction.
According to the next proposition, sometimes it is possible to design two
sets of bid constraints so that all trustworthy bidders prefer one set and all
untrustworthy bidders prefer the other. Thus, by choosing a set of constraints,
bidders disclose their type. This allows the auctioneer to evaluate the utility of
each bid and to determine the winner. Since the auctioneer knows the bidders’
types, he can associate every trustworthy bid with β and every untrustworthy
bid with α.
Proposition 4. If Vq(0, α) > Cq(0, β), then there exists a constrained-
bidding auction that separates trustworthy from untrustworthy bidders.
P r o o f. Figure 2 shows the zero-utility indifference curves for the bidders
and the auctioneer. Lines Jtrust and Juntr represent the auctioneer’s indifference
curves for trustworthy and untrustworthy bidders, respectively. Similarly, lines
Itrust and Iuntr represent the indifference curves for trustworthy and untrust-
worthy bidders.
Point C is defined as the intersection of Itrust and Juntr. Since Vq(0, α) >
Cq(0, β), A is well defined and A 6= (0, 0).
qA is chosen as the quantity satisfying:
V (qA, β)− C(qA, β) = V (qC , α)− C(qC , α)
Point B has coordinates (qA, C(aA, β)), and lies on the curve Itrust. Point D
is defined as (qC , C(qC , α) + C(aA, β) − C(qA, α)). The definition of the points
A,B,C and D implies
W (A,α) = W (C,α)(5)
W (B,α) = W (D,α)(6)
That is, A and C lie on the same indifference curve for an untrustworthy bidder,
and B and D lie on another indifference curve. That is, an untrustworthy bidder
is indifferent between selling quantity qA at price pA and quantity qC at price pC .
Similarly, he is indifferent between quantity qC at price pC , and quantity qD at
price pD. Consider the sets of bid constraints CAB and CCD defined as follows:
CAB = {q = qA, and p ∈ [pB, pA]}
CCD = {q = qC , and p ∈ [pD, pC ]}
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Fig. 2. A separating set of bid constraints
If a bidder chooses to submit bids satisfying CAB , then he has to bid a fixed
quantity, qA, the maximal price is pA, and the minimal price is pB .
Equations (5) and (6) imply that an untrustworthy bidder is indifferent
between two sets of constraints, CAB and CCD (under Assumption 1). On the
other hand, Figure 2 shows that CCD offers non-positive utility for a trustworthy
bidder (line CD is below the zero-utility indifference curve Itrust), while CAB
offers only non-negative utility. Therefore, a trustworthy bidder prefers CAB to
CCD.
To make the untrustworthy bidder’s preferences strong, the line AB can
be shifted to the left by an infinitesimal amount . This will make an untrust-
worthy bidder strongly prefer bidding on line CD without changing the preferen-
ces for a trustworthy bidder.
Note that the auctioneer is indifferent between CAB and CCD:
U(A, β) = U(C,α) = 0
U(B, β) = U(D,α) = pC − pD = pA − pB
That is, each set of constraints offers the same utility range, [0, pC − pD], to the
auctioneer and to all types of bidders.
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The bidding schedule AB looks the same to trustworthy bidders as does
schedule CD to untrustworthy bidders. The only difference between the schedules
is that one of them is parallely shifted to compensate for cost differences between
agents’ types. Both types of bidders bid in the same price range (since pC−pD =
pA−pB) and they receive the same utility from prices which are equally distanced
from the minimal ones. In other words, each bidding schedule is equivalent to a
single-unit auction with an auctioneer’s reservation price pC − pD and a bidder’s
reservation price 0.
Therefore, when presented with a choice between bidding schedules CAB
and CCD, trustworthy bidders chose CAB, and untrustworthy bidders chose
CCD. 
According to Proposition 4, auction rules can be designed to eliminate the
strategic consequences arising from differences in bidders’ types. In such cases,
the auctioneer can offer two bidding schedules so that the first type bidders choose
the first schedule and the second type choose the second schedule. Both types of
bidders face the same reservation utility and the same strategic choices.
Another observation is that, in order to separate trustworthy from un-
trustworthy bidders, the auctioneer must split a two-dimensional auction (on
price and quantity) into two inidimensional (on price only) bidding schedules.
It should be pointed out that a separating auction does not prevent
untrustworthy bidders from winning. What distinguishes a separating auction
from distrust-based and expectation-based auctions is that the auctioneer can
exactly evaluate bids and choose the most profitable bid. In addition, when the
difference in trustworthiness, β − α, is sufficiently large, trustworthy agents are
not driven out of the market, as is the case for the other auctions.
A separating auction can have a variety of auction rules. It could be, for
instance, a second-price sealed-bid auction where a bidder chooses between two
predefined quantities (either qA or qC in Figure 2) and submits a price for that
quantity. According to Proposition 4, trustworthy bidders choose qA and bid pB ,
while untrustworthy bidders choose qC and bid pD. In both cases, the auctioneer
receives utility pA − pB.
It should be pointed out that a separating auction may not maximize the
social welfare. Obviously, some price has to be paid for the possibility to separate
agent types.
For example, in order to maximize his utility in a second-score auction,
the auctioneer will choose bidding schedules with maximal utility range, pA−pB .
That is, the auctioneer will choose quantity q ′′C such that:
q′′C = argmax
q
(V (q, α) − C(q, α))
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If the auctioneer knew the type of each bidder, then he could fix the quantity to
q′C = argmax
q
(V (q, β)− C(q, β))
or to
q′′C = argmax
q
(V (q, α) − C(q, α))
depending on which agent type is more profitable for him. It is apparent, that in
the case where trustworthy agents offer more utility to the auctioneer, the social
welfare is not maximized. If, however, untrustworthy agents are more efficient,
then a separating auction is socially optimal. Whether trustworthy agents are
more efficient than untrustworthy ones, depends on the value, V (q, θ), and the
cost function, C(q, θ). If the social cost of trustworthiness is less than its social
value, then trustworthy agents will be more efficient, and vice versa.
5. A generalization of the Vickrey auction. In this section we
describe a generalization of the Vickrey auction to the case of untrustworthy
bidders. We drop Assumption 1 and the restriction of having only two types of
bidders. The generalized auction is applicable to situations with a continuum of
bidder types.
In the generalized auction each bidder submits a bid on price, quantity,
and a declaration of trustworthiness (p, q, θˆ). The auction uses a constrained-
bidding schedule where each bidder is required to submit the maximal price for
each combination of quantity and price:
(7) p = C(q, θˆ)
We assume that the cost function is known to the auctioneer who can then check
Condition (7) for each bid and verify its validity. The score function is equal to
the auctioneer’s utility, assuming that every bidder truthfully declares his type,
i.e., θˆ = θ. The winner is the bidder with the highest score (ties are resolved
randomly). The winning bidder matches the highest rejected score by choosing
a price and a quantity, which generate the same score. The central point of the
auction rules is that, in matching the second-highest score, the winner is assumed
to have the same type as the highest-rejected bidder. In other words, the winner
is allowed to choose a price and a quantity that generate the highest-rejected score
using the declared trustworthiness of the highest-rejected bidder. More formally:
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Definition 4. In the generalized Vickrey auction each bidder submits a
bid b = (p, q, θˆ). Bidding is constrained and eligible bids must satisfy Equation
(7). The score is defined as:
S(p, q, θˆ) = V (q, θˆ)− p
The highest score wins. The price and quantity are chosen by the winner to
satisfy:
p = V (q, θˆs)− V (qs, θˆs) + ps(8)
Vq(q, θˆs)− Cq(q, θˆ) = 0(9)
where (ps, qs, θˆs) is the second-highest bid. As usual, subscripts denote partial
derivatives.
Condition (9) guarantees that the winner matches the second-highest
score, while Equation (10) ensures that the marginal cost of the winner is equal
to the marginal value which the auctioneer could have received from the second-
highest bidder. Note that Condition (9) requires the winner to match the second-
highest score under the assumption that he has the type of the second-highest
bidder.
Proposition 5. In the generalized Vickrey auction, it is a dominant
strategy for each bidder to truthfully report his trustworthiness.
P r o o f. The utility of the winner is given by:
W (p, q, θ) = p− C(q, θ)
where p and q are the price and quantity satisfying Equations (8)–(9). From
Equation (8) it follows that:
W (p, q, θ) = V (q, θˆs)− V (qs, θˆs) + ps − C(q, θ)
The winner will choose quantity q to maximize his utility. Therefore,
Vq(q, θˆs)− Cq(q, θ) = 0
On the other hand, Equation (9) requires:
Vq(q, θˆs)− Cq(q, θˆ) = 0
Therefore the winner will maximize his utility if and only if θ = θˆ. 
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Fig. 3. Indifference curves for a bidder and an auctionner
The simple intuition behind the generalized Vickrey auction is presented
in Figure 3. The winner is allowed to pick a quantity and a price that match
the second-highest score, under the assumption that the winner has the type of
the second-highest bidder. Point B in Figure 3 represents the second-highest
bid. J is the indifference curve of the auctioneer for the type declared by the
second-highest bidder. That is, the winner is allowed to move along the curve
in choosing quantity and price. Clearly, the winner’s profit is maximized at the
tangency point between his indifference curve I and the auctioneer’s indifference
curve J . The angle at the tangency point is uniquely determined by the winner’s
type θ. Equation (9) requires the winner to pick a tangency in accordance with
his declaration θˆ. Therefore, the winner maximizes his utility if and only if he
truthfully declares his type. Note that a truthful declaration neither increases
nor decreases an agent’s chances of winning the auction. Since agents submit
multidimensional bids, they can always make tradeoffs between bid parameters.
6. Conclusions. In the paper we have analyzed a multidimensional
auction in which a trustworthy buyer faces sellers with different degrees of trust-
worthiness. We proposed two mechanisms that make bidders directly or indirectly
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reveal their trustworthiness. The first mechanism is based on discriminating
bidding schedules. We have proved that, under certain conditions, it is possible to
design bidding schedules that separate trustworthy from untrustworthy bidders.
The second mechanism is a generalization of the Vickrey auction to the
case of untrustworthy bidders. We proved that, if the winner is considered to
have the trustworthiness of the second-highest bidder, truthfully declaring one’s
trustworthiness becomes a dominant strategy.
We expect the proposed mechanisms to reduce the cost of trust manage-
ment and to eliminate some market failures and inefficiencies caused by lack of
trust. By eliminating the need to manipulate and speculate about other bidder’
trustworthiness, the mechanisms could also simplify the architecture of economic
software agents. In risky environments, the mechanisms could enable mutually
beneficial interactions which are otherwise costly to enforce or cannot be enforced
by third parties.
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